History of the World/History of the World (Bureau Development, Inc.)(1992).BIN/dp/0036/00368.txt

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$Unique_ID{how00368}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Battle Of Arbela
Part II}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Creasy, Sir Edward Shepherd}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{alexander
cavalry
left
persian
darius
wing
right
alexander's
army
macedonian}
$Date{}
$Log{}
Title:       Battle Of Arbela
Author:      Creasy, Sir Edward Shepherd

Part II

     The estimate which we find in Arrian of the strength of Alexander's army
seems reasonable enough, when we take into account both the losses which he
had sustained and the reenforcements which he had received since he left
Europe.  Indeed, to Englishmen, who know with what mere handfuls of men ourown
generals have, at Plassy, at Assaye, at Meeanee, and other Indian battles,
routed large hosts of Asiatics, the disparity of numbers that we read of in
the victories won by the Macedonians over the Persians presents nothing
incredible.  The army which Alexander now led was wholly composed of veteran
troops in the highest possible state of equipment and discipline,
enthusiastically devoted to their leader, and full of confidence in his
military genius and his victorious destiny.

     The celebrated Macedonian phalanx formed the main strength of his
infantry.  This force had been raised and organized by his father, Philip,
who, on his accession to the Macedonian throne, needed a numerous and quickly
formed army, and who, by lengthening the spear of the ordinary Greek phalanx,
and increasing the depth of the files, brought the tactics of armed masses to
the highest extent of which it was capable with such materials as he
possessed.  He formed his men sixteen deep, and placed in their grasp the
sarissa, as the Macedonian pike was called, which was four-and-twenty feet in
length, and, when couched for action, reached eighteen feet in front of the
soldier; so that, as a space of about two feet was allowed between the ranks,
the spears of the five files behind him projected in front of each front-rank
man.

     The phalangite soldier was fully equipped in the defensive armor of the
regular Greek infantry.  And thus the phalanx presented a ponderous and
bristling mass, which, as long as its order was kept compact, was sure to bear
down all opposition.  The defects of such an organization are obvious, and
were proved in after-years, when the Macedonians were opposed to the Roman
legions.  But it is clear that under Alexander the phalanx was not the
cumbrous, unwieldy body which it was at Cynoscephalae and Pydna.  His men were
veterans; and he could obtain from them an accuracy of movement and steadiness
of evolution such as probably the recruits of his father would only have
floundered in attempting, and such as certainly were impracticable in the
phalanx when handled by his successors, especially as under them it ceased to
be a standing force, and became only a militia.

     Under Alexander the phalanx consisted of an aggregate of eighteen
thousand men, who were divided into six brigades of three thousand each. These
were again subdivided into regiments and companies; and the men were carefully
trained to wheel, to face about, to take more ground, or to close up, as the
emergencies of the battle required.  Alexander also arrayed troops armed in a
different manner in the intervals of the regiments of his phalangites, who
could prevent their line from being pierced and their companies taken in
flank, when the nature of the ground prevented a close formation, and who
could be withdrawn when a favorable opportunity arrived for closing up the
phalanx or any of its brigades for a charge, or when it was necessary to
prepare to received cavalry.

     Besides the phalanx, Alexander had a considerable force of infantry who
were called shield-bearers: they were not so heavily armed as the phalangites,
or as was the case with the Greek regular infantry in general, but they were
equipped for close fight as well as for skirmishing, and were far superior to
the ordinary irregular troops of Greek warfare.  They were about six thousand
strong.  Besides these, he had several bodies of Greek regular infantry; and
he had archers, slingers, and javelin-men, who fought also with broadsword and
target, and who were principally supplied him by the highlanders of Illyria
and Thracia.

     The main strength of his cavalry consisted in two chosen regiments of
cuirassiers, one Macedonian and one Thessalian, each of which was about
fifteen hundred strong.  They were provided with long lances and heavy swords,
and horse as well as man was fully equipped with defensive armor. Other
regiments of regular cavalry were less heavily armed, and there were several
bodies of light-horsemen, whom Alexander's conquests in Egypt and Syria had
enabled him to mount superbly.

     A little before the end of August, Alexander crossed the Euphrates at
Thapsacus, a small corps of Persian cavalry under Mazaeus retiring before him.
Alexander was too prudent to march down through the Mesopotamian deserts, and
continued to advance eastward with the intention of passing the Tigris, and
then, if he was unable to find Darius and bring him to action, of marching
southward on the left side of that river along the skirts of a mountainous
district where his men would suffer less from heat and thirst, and where
provisions would be more abundant.

     Darius, finding that his adversary was not to be enticed into the march
through Mesopotamia against his capital, determined to remain on the
battle-ground, which he had chosen on the left of the Tigris; where, if his
enemy met a defeat or a check, the destruction of the invaders would be
certain with two such rivers as the Euphrates and the Tigris in their rear.

     The Persian King availed himself to the utmost of every advantage in his
power.  He caused a large space of ground to be carefully levelled for the
operation of his scythe-armed chariots; and he deposited his military stores
in the strong town of Arbela, about twenty miles in his rear.  The
rhetoricians of after-ages have loved to describe Darius Codomanus as a second
Xerxes in ostentation and imbecility; but a fair examination of his
generalship in this his last campaign shows that he was worthy of bearing the
same name as his great predecessor, the royal son of Hystaspes.

     On learning that Darius was with a large army on the left of the Tigris,
Alexander hurried forward and crossed that river without opposition.  He was
at first unable to procure any certain intelligence of the precise position of
the enemy, and after giving his army a short interval of rest he marched for
four days down the left bank of the river.

     A moralist may pause upon the fact that Alexander must in this march have
passed within a few miles of the ruins of Nineveh, the great city of the
primaeval conquerors of the human race.  Neither the Macedonian King nor any
of his followers knew what those vast mounds had once been.  They had already
sunk into utter destruction; and it is only within the last few years that the
intellectual energy of one of our own countrymen has rescued Nineveh from its
long centuries of oblivion.

     On the fourth day of Alexander's southward march, his advance guard
reported that a body of the enemy's cavalry was in sight.  He instantly formed
his army in order for battle, and directing them to advance steadily he rode
forward at the head of some squadrons of cavalry and charged the Persian
horse, whom he found before him.  This was a mere reconnoitring party, and
they broke and fled immediately; but the Macedonians made some prisoners, and
from them Alexander found that Darius was posted only a few miles off, and
learned the strength of the army that he had with him.  On receiving this news
Alexander halted, and gave his men repose for four days, so that they should
go into action fresh and vigorous.  He also fortified his camp and deposited
in it all his military stores and all his sick and disabled soldiers,
intending to advance upon the enemy with the serviceable part of his army
perfectly unencumbered.

     After this halt, he moved forward, while it was yet dark, with the
intention of reaching the enemy, and attacking them at break of day.  About
half way between the camps there were some undulations of the ground, which
concealed the two armies from each other's view; but, on Alexander arriving at
their summit, he saw, by the early light, the Persian host arrayed before him,
and he probably also observed traces of some engineering operation having been
carried on along part of the ground in front of them.

     Not knowing that these marks had been caused by the Persians having
levelled the ground for the free use of their war chariots, Alexander
suspected that hidden pitfalls had been prepared with a view of disordering
the approach of his cavalry.  He summoned a council of war forthwith.  Some of
the officers were for attacking instantly, at all hazards; but the more
prudent opinion of Parmenio prevailed, and it was determined not to advance
farther till the battle-ground had been carefully surveyed.

     Alexander halted his army on the heights, and, taking with him some
light-armed infantry and some cavalry, he passed part of the day in
reconnoitring the enemy and observing the nature of the ground which he had to
fight on.  Darius wisely refrained from moving from his position to attack the
Macedonians on the eminences which they occupied, and the two armies remained
until night without molesting each other.

     On Alexander's return to his headquarters, he summoned his generals and
superior officers together, and telling them that he knew well that their zeal
wanted no exhortation, he besought them to do their utmost in encouraging and
instructing those whom each commanded, to do their best in the next day's
battle.  They were to remind them that they were now not going to fight for a
province as they had hitherto fought, but they were about to decide by their
swords the dominion of all Asia.  Each officer ought to impress this upon his
subalterns, and they should urge it on their men. Their natural courage
required no long words to excite its ardor; but they should be reminded of the
paramount importance of steadiness in action.  The silence in the ranks must
be unbroken as long as silence was proper; but when the time came for the
charge, the shout and the cheer must be full of terror for the foe.  The
officers were to be alert in receiving and communicating orders; and everyone
was to act as if he felt that the whole result of the battle depended on his
own single good conduct.

     Having thus briefly instructed his generals, Alexander ordered that the
army should sup and take their rest for the night.

     Darkness had closed over the tents of the Macedonians when Alexander's
veteran general, Parmenio, came to him and proposed that they should make a
night attack on the Persians.  The King is said to have answered that he
scorned to filch a victory, and that Alexander must conquer openly and fairly.
Arrian justly remarks that Alexander's resolution was as wise as it was
spirited.  Besides the confusion and uncertainty which are inseparable from
night engagements, the value of Alexander's victory would have been impaired
if gained under circumstances which might supply the enemy with any excuse for
his defeat, and encourage him to renew the contest.  It was necessary for
Alexander not only to beat Darius, but to gain such a victory as should leave
his rival without apology and without hope of recovery.

     The Persians, in fact, expected and were prepared to meet a night attack.
Such was the apprehension that Darius entertained of it that he formed his
troops at evening in order of battle, and kept them under arms all night.  The
effect of this was that the morning found them jaded and dispirited, while it
brought their adversaries all fresh and vigorous against them.

     The written order of battle which Darius himself caused to be drawn up
fell into the hands of the Macedonians after the engagement, and Aristobulus
copied it into his journal.  We thus possess, through Arrian, unusually
authentic information as to the composition and arrangement of the Persian
army.  On the extreme left were the Bactrian, Daan, and Arachosian cavalry.
Next to these Darius placed the troops from Persia proper, both horse and
foot.  Then came the Susians, and next to these the Cadusians.  These forces
made up the left wing.

     Darius' own station was in the centre.  This was composed of the Indians,
the Carians, the Mardian archers, and the division of Persians who were
distinguished by the golden apples that formed the knobs of their spears.
Here also were stationed the bodyguard of the Persian nobility. Besides these,
there were, in the centre, formed in deep order, the Uxian and Babylonian
troops and the soldiers from the Red Sea.  The brigade of Greek mercenaries
whom Darius had in his service, and who alone were considered fit to stand the
charge of the Macedonian phalanx, was drawn up on either side of the royal
chariot.

     The right wing was composed of the Coelosyrians and Mesopotamians, the
Medes, the Parthians, the Sacians, the Tapurians, Hyrcanians, Albanians, and
Sacesinae.  In advance of the line on the left wing were placed the Scythian
cavalry, with a thousand of the Bactrian horse and a hundred scythe-armed
chariots.  The elephants and fifty scythe-armed chariots were ranged in front
of the centre; and fifty more chariots, with the Armenian and Cappadocian
cavalry, were drawn up in advance of the right wing.

     Thus arrayed, the great host of King Darius passed the night that to many
thousands of them was the last of their existence.  The morning of the first
of October ^1 dawned slowly to their wearied watching, and they could hear the
note of the Macedonian trumpet sounding to arms, and could see King
Alexander's forces descend from their tents on the heights and form in order
of battle on the plain.

[Footnote 1: The battle was fought eleven days after an eclipse of the moon,
which gives the means of fixing the precise date.]

     There was deep need of skill, as well as of valor, on Alexander's side;
and few battle-fields have witnessed more consummate generalship than was now
displayed by the Macedonian King.  There were no natural barriers by which he
could protect his flanks; and not only was he certain to be overlapped on
either wing by the vast lines of the Persian army, but there was imminent risk
of their circling round him, and charging him in the rear, while he advanced
against their centre.  He formed, therefore, a second, or reserve line, which
was to wheel round, if required, or to detach troops to either flank, as the
enemy's movements might necessitate; and thus, with their whole army ready at
any moment to be thrown into one vast hollow square, the Macedonians advanced
in two lines against the enemy, Alexander himself leading on the right wing,
and the renowned phalanx forming the centre, while Parmenio commanded on the
left.

     Such was the general nature of the disposition which Alexander made of
his army.  But we have in Arrian the details of the position of each brigade
and regiment; and as we know that these details were taken from the journals
of Macedonian generals, it is interesting to examine them, and to read the
names and stations of King Alexander's generals and colonels in this the
greatest of his battles.

     The eight regiments of the royal horse-guards formed the right of
Alexander's line.  Their colonels were Clitus - whose regiment was on the
extreme right, the post of peculiar danger - Glaucias, Ariston, Sopolis,
Heraclides, Demetrias, Meleager, and Hegelochus.  Philotas was general of the
whole division.  Then came the shield-bearing infantry: Nicanor was their
general.  Then came the phalanx in six brigades.  Coenus' brigade was on the
right, and nearest to the shield-bearers; next to this stood the brigade of
Perdiccas, then Meleager's, then Polysperchon's; and then the brigade of
Amynias, but which was now commanded by Simmias, as Amynias had been sent to
Macedonia to levy recruits.  Then came the infantry of the left wing, under
the command of Craterus.

     Next to Craterus' infantry were placed the cavalry regiments of the
allies, with Eriguius for their general.  The Thessalian cavalry, commanded by
Philippus, were next, and held the extreme left of the whole army.  The whole
left wing was intrusted to the command of Parmenio, who had round his person
the Pharsalian regiment of cavalry, which was the strongest and best of all
the Thessalian horse regiments.

     The centre of the second line was occupied by a body of phalangite
infantry, formed of companies which were drafted for this purpose from each of
the brigades of their phalanx.  The officers in command of this corps were
ordered to be ready to face about if the enemy should succeed in gaining the
rear of the army.  On the right of this reserve of infantry, in the second
line, and behind the royal horse-guards, Alexander placed half the Agrian
light-armed infantry under Attalus, and with them Brison's body of Macedonian
archers and Cleander's regiment of foot.  He also placed in this part of his
army Menidas' squadron of cavalry and Aretes' and Ariston's light horse.
Menidas was ordered to watch if the enemy's cavalry tried to turn their flank,
and, if they did so, to charge them before they wheeled completely round, and
so take them in flank themselves.

     A similar force was arranged on the left of the second line for the same
purpose.  The Thracian infantry of Sitalces were placed there, and Coeranus'
regiment of the cavalry of the Greek allies, and Agathon's troops of the
Odrysian irregular horse.  The extreme left of the second line in this quarter
was held by Andromachus' cavalry.  A division of Thracian infantry was left in
guard of the camp.  In advance of the right wing and centre was scattered a
number of light-armed troops, of javelin-men and bowmen, with the intention of
warding off the charge of the armed chariots. ^1

[Footnote 1: Kleber's arrangement of his troops at the battle of Heliopolis,
where, with ten thousand Europeans, he had to encounter eighty thousand
Asiatics in an open plain, is worth comparing with Alexander's tactics at
Arbela.  See Thiers' Histoire du Consulat.]

     Conspicuous by the brilliancy of his armor, and by the chosen band of
officers who were round his person, Alexander took his own station, as his
custom was, in the right wing, at the head of his cavalry; and when all the
arrangements for the battle were complete, and his generals were fully
instructed how to act in each probable emergency, he began to lead his men
toward the enemy.

     It was ever his custom to expose his life freely in battle, and to
emulate the personal prowess of his great ancestor, Achilles.  Perhaps, in the
bold enterprise of conquering Persia, it was politic for Alexander to raise
his army's daring to the utmost by the example of his own heroic valor; and,
in his subsequent campaigns, the love of the excitement, of "the raptures of
the strife," may have made him, like Murat, continue from choice a custom
which he commenced from duty.  But he never suffered the ardor of the soldier
to make him lose the coolness of the general.

     Great reliance had been placed by the Persian King on the effects of the
scythe-bearing chariots.  It was designed to launch these against the
Macedonian phalanx, and to follow them up by a heavy charge of cavalry, which,
it was hoped, would find the ranks of the spearmen disordered by the rush of
the chariots, and easily destroy this most formidable part of Alexander's
force.  In front, therefore, of the Persian centre, where Darius took his
station, and which it was supposed that the phalanx would attack, the ground
had been carefully levelled and smoothed, so as to allow the chariots to
charge over it with their full sweep and speed.

     As the Macedonian army approached the Persian, Alexander found that the
front of his whole line barely equalled the front of the Persian centre, so
that he was outflanked on his right by the entire left wing of the enemy, and
by their entire right wing on his left.  His tactics were to assail some one
point of the hostile army, and gain a decisive advantage, while he refused, as
far as possible, the encounter along the rest of the line.  He therefore
inclined his order of march to the right, so as to enable his right wing and
centre to come into collision with the enemy on as favorable terms as
possible, although the manoeuvre might in some respect compromise his left.

     The effect of this oblique movement was to bring the phalanx and his own
wing nearly beyond the limits of the ground which the Persians had prepared
for the operations of the chariots; and Darius, fearing to lose the benefit of
this arm against the most important parts of the Macedonian force, ordered the
Scythian and Bactrian cavalry, who were drawn up in advance on his extreme
left, to charge round upon Alexander's right wing, and check its farther
lateral progress.  Against these assailants Alexander sent from his second
line Menidas' cavalry.  As these proved too few to make head against the
enemy, he ordered Ariston also from the second line with his right horse, and
Cleander with his foot, in support of Menidas.

     The Bactrians and Scythians now began to give way; but Darius reenforced
them by the mass of Bactrian cavalry from his main line, and an obstinate
cavalry fight now took place.  The Bactrians and Scythians were numerous, and
were better armed than the horsemen under Menidas and Ariston; and the loss at
first was heaviest on the Macedonian side.  But still the European cavalry
stood the charge of the Asiatics, and at last, by their superior discipline,
and by acting in squadrons that supported each other, ^1 instead of fighting
in a confused mass like the barbarians, the Macedonians broke their
adversaries and drove them off the field.

[Footnote 1: The best explanation of this may be found in Napoleon's account
of the cavalry fights between the French and the mamelukes: "Two mamelukes
were able to make head against three Frenchmen, because they were better
armed, better mounted, and better trained; they had two pair of pistols, a
blunderbuss, a carbine, a helmet with a visor, and a coat of mail; they had
several horses, and several attendants on foot.  One hundred cuirassiers,
however, were not afraid of one hundred mamelukes; three hundred could beat an
equal number, and one thousand could easily put to the rout fifteen hundred,
so great is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! Leclerc and
Lasalle presented their men to the mamelukes in several lines. When the Arabs
were on the point of overwhelming the first, the second came to its assistance
on the right and left; the mamelukes then halted and wheeled, in order to turn
the wings of this new line; this moment was always seized upon to charge them,
and they were uniformly broken."]

     Darius now directed the scythe-armed chariots to be driven against
Alexander's horse-guards and the phalanx, and these formidable vehicles were
accordingly sent rattling across the plain, against the Macedonian line. When
we remember the alarm which the war chariots of the Britons created among
Caesar's legions, we shall not be prone to deride this arm of ancient warfare
as always useless.  The object of the chariots was to create unsteadiness in
the ranks against which they were driven, and squadrons of cavalry followed
close upon them to profit by such disorder.  But the Asiatic chariots were
rendered ineffective at Arbela by the light-armed troops, whom Alexander had
specially appointed for the service, and who, wounding the horses and drivers
with their missile weapons, and running alongside so as to cut the traces or
seize the reins, marred the intended charge; and the few chariots that reached
the phalanx passed harmlessly through the intervals which the spearmen opened
for them, and were easily captured in the rear.

     A mass of the Asiatic cavalry was now, for the second time, collected
against Alexander's extreme right, and moved round it, with the view of
gaining the flank of his army.  At the critical moment, when their own flanks
were exposed by this evolution, Aretes dashed on the Persian squadrons with
his horsemen from Alexander's second line.  While Alexander thus met and
baffled all the flanking attacks of the enemy with troops brought up from his
second line, he kept his own horse-guards and the rest of the front line of
his wing fresh, and ready to take advantage of the first opportunity for
striking a decisive blow.

     This soon came.  A large body of horse, who were posted on the Persian
left wing nearest to the centre, quitted their station, and rode off to help
their comrades in the cavalry fight that still was going on at the extreme
right of Alexander's wing against the detachments from his second line.  This
made a huge gap in the Persian array, and into this space Alexander instantly
charged with his guard and all the cavalry of his wing; and then, pressing
toward his left, he soon began to make havoc in the left flank of the Persian
centre.  The shield-bearing infantry now charged also among the reeling masses
of the Asiatics; and five of the brigades of the phalanx, with the
irresistible might of their sarissas, bore down the Greek mercenaries of
Darius, and dug their way through the Persian centre.

     In the early part of the battle Darius had showed skill and energy; and
he now, for some time, encouraged his men, by voice and example, to keep firm.
But the lances of Alexander's cavalry and the pikes of the phalanx now pressed
nearer and nearer to him.  His charioteer was struck down by a javelin at his
side; and at last Darius' nerve failed him, and, descending from his chariot,
he mounted on a fleet horse and galloped from the plain, regardless of the
state of the battle in other parts of the field, where matters were going on
much more favorably for his cause, and where his presence might have done much
toward gaining a victory.

     Alexander's operations with his right and centre had exposed his left to
an immensely preponderating force of the enemy.  Parmenio kept out of action
as long as possible; but Mazaeus, who commanded the Persian right wing,
advanced against him, completely outflanked him, and pressed him severely with
reiterated charges by superior numbers.

     Seeing the distress of Parmenio's wing, Simmias, who commanded the sixth
brigade of the phalanx, which was next to the left wing, did not advance with
the other brigades in the great charge upon the Persian centre, but kept back
to cover Parmenio's troops on their right flank, as otherwise they would have
been completely surrounded and cut off from the rest of the Macedonian army.
By so doing, Simmias had unavoidably opened a gap in the Macedonian left
centre; and a large column of Indian and Persian horse, from the Persian right
centre, had galloped forward through this interval, and right through the
troops of the Macedonian second line.  Instead of then wheeling round upon
Parmenio, or upon the rear of Alexander's conquering wing, the Indian and
Persian cavalry rode straight on to the Macedonian camp, overpowered the
Thracians who were left in charge of it, and began to plunder.  This was
stopped by the phalangite troops of the second line, who, after the enemy's
horsemen had rushed by them, faced about, countermarched upon the camp, killed
many of the Indians and Persians in the act of plundering, and forced the rest
to ride off again.

     Just at this crisis, Alexander had been recalled from his pursuit of
Darius by tidings of the distress of Parmenio and of his inability to bear up
any longer against the hot attacks of Mazaeus.  Taking his horse-guards with
him, Alexander rode toward the part of the field where his left wing was
fighting; but on his way thither he encountered the Persian and Indian cavalry
on their return from his camp.

     These men now saw that their only chance of safety was to cut their way
through, and in one huge column they charged desperately upon the Macedonian
regiments.  There was here a close hand-to-hand fight, which lasted some time,
and sixty of the royal horse-guards fell, and three generals, who fought close
to Alexander's side, were wounded.  At length the Macedonian discipline and
valor again prevailed, and a large number of the Persian and Indian horsemen
were cut down, some few only succeeding in breaking through and riding away.

     Relieved of these obstinate enemies, Alexander again formed his regiments
of horse-guards, and led them toward Parmenio; but by this time that general
also was victorious.  Probably the news of Darius' flight had reached Mazaeus,
and had damped the ardor of the Persian right wing, while the tidings of their
comrades' success must have proportionally encouraged the Macedonian forces
under Parmenio.  His Thessalian cavalry particularly distinguished themselves
by their gallantry and persevering good conduct; and by the time that
Alexander had ridden up to Parmenio, the whole Persian army was in full flight
from the field.

     It was of the deepest importance to Alexander to secure the person of
Darius, and he now urged on the pursuit.  The river Lycus was between the
field of battle and the city of Arbela, whither the fugitives directed their
course, and the passage of this river was even more destructive to the
Persians than the swords and spears of the Macedonians had been in the
engagement. ^1

[Footnote 1: I purposely omit any statement of the loss in the battle. There
is a palpable error of the transcribers in the numbers which we find in our
present manuscripts of Arrian, and Curtius is of no authority.]

     The narrow bridge was soon choked up by the flying thousands who rushed
toward it, and vast numbers of the Persians threw themselves, or were hurried
by others, into the rapid stream, and perished in its waters.  Darius had
crossed it, and had ridden on through Arbela without halting.  Alexander
reached the city on the next day, and made himself master of all Darius'
treasure and stores; but the Persian King, unfortunately for himself, had fled
too fast for his conqueror, but had only escaped to perish by the treachery of
his Bactrian satrap, Bessus.

     A few days after the battle Alexander entered Babylon, "the oldest seat
of earthly empire" then in existence, as its acknowledged lord and master.
There were yet some campaigns of his brief and bright career to be
accomplished.  Central Asia was yet to witness the march of his phalanx.  He
was yet to effect that conquest of Afghanistan in which England since has
failed.  His generalship, as well as his valor, was yet to be signalized on
the banks of the Hydaspes and the field of Chillianwallah; and he was yet to
precede the queen of England in annexing the Punjab to the dominions of a
European sovereign.  But the crisis of his career was reached; the great
object of his mission was accomplished; and the ancient Persian empire, which
once menaced all the nations of the earth with subjection, was irreparably
crushed when Alexander had won his crowning victory at Arbela.